

references; it would have been useful to have an index also to key terms and themes, particularly in view of the warp-and-woof structure of such a complex topic.

These formal issues aside, the content of Staliūnas's book illuminates a place, time, and set of circumstances that deserves thorough understanding. This meticulously crafted, thoughtful work rises admirably to the formidable task. It will be important reading for students of the Russian Empire and of nationality/language policy in multiethnic states, both historical and contemporary.

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Sergeev, Evgeny. *Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904–05: Secret Operations on Land and at Sea*. Routledge Studies in the History of Russia and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge, 2007. xvii + 254 pp. \$135.00. ISBN 0-415-41618-3.

Modern conflicts are characterized by immense intelligence activities. Present-day nations run huge infrastructures that collect, analyze, process, and disseminate all possible information on friend and foe alike, and consider these activities a vital asset as well as a symbol of national prowess. This was not always the case. Premodern wars were fought with the belligerents having little knowledge of their enemies or their capabilities. The significance of intelligence gathering began to grow in the nineteenth century, and in this respect the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) seems to be a crossroads, if not a turning point.

Indeed, in this nineteen-month campaign, fought over vast and forbidding territory far from the capital, with various sophisticated weapon systems and wireless communication in use for the first time, military intelligence was indispensable as never before. It is commonly accepted that the use or misuse of military intelligence affected, if it did not determine, the course of this war right from its outset. Still, whereas the Japanese exploited an efficient network of agents to form an accurate picture of their foes before and during the campaign, the Russians misunderstood Japan's motives and strategic vision and were ignorant of its general capacity and tactical skills.

Regretfully, this prevalent view, especially concerning shortcomings of the Russian side, is not based on sound research but on an anti-tsarist agenda, or at best, on a deterministic view shaped by the war's outcomes. Evgeny Sergeev, professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences State University of Humanitarian Studies, has ventured to fill in this lacuna. Based on archive documents, some of them inaccessible during the Soviet era, his book offers a new and certainly the most complete overview hitherto in English of Russia's military intelligence in the northeast Asian arena before and during the Russo-Japanese War. The book is thus an important addition to the growing list of studies published recently on the tsarist army in general and the development of its military intelligence branch and its activities during the war against Japan in particular.

Sergeev endeavors to describe and analyze the Russian intelligence assessment of Japan on the eve of the war, as well as its tactical contribution in the subsequent campaigns from the initial attack on Port Arthur, via the ground campaigns in Liaoyang, Shaho, and Mukden, the naval fiasco in Tsushima, to the final decision to conclude the war during the peace negotiations in Portsmouth. Sergeev offers a lucid portrait of the Russian intelligence network and its efforts at adaptation and improvements during the war. He is less successful in deciphering the way the information collected was interpreted, and is completely silent about its dissemination among, and its significance for, the Russian decision makers in the capital and at the front, and to what extent their decisions were affected by faulty intelligence. Moreover, while Sergeev does an admirable job in describing the structure of the Russian intelligence network during the Manchurian campaign and its contribution to the war efforts, he seems to overlook the grand picture of intelligence incapacity.

The Russian intelligence debacle in 1904–5 was greater, in fact, than the American debacle in Pearl Harbor thirty seven years later. Both were unable to predict Japanese plans for a preemptive attack, although it was the Russian intelligence that never fully recovered in the subsequent stages of the war. Until the very end it kept providing the army and navy with limited and often inaccurate

tactical and strategic information, leading eventually to the victory of Japan, a nation far more limited in its resources than Russia. The book does not deal systematically with this cardinal issue, and the reasons for the fiasco are treated only implicitly. An answer is yet to be found as to whether the root of the Russian intelligence shortcomings lay in insufficient collection of information, in its interpretation, in deficient dissemination, or in all of these elements. Among the many questions the book leaves us with, the most curious concerns the materials found in the Russian archives, as the author does not elaborate sufficiently to what extent his thematic focus was determined by the materials at hand.

These shortcomings, however, do not diminish the importance of Sergeev's book. By concentrating on the tactical contribution of military intelligence to the Russian forces in Manchuria, Sergeev fills in a significant lacuna. With this book, scholars relying on English-language materials suddenly have available more information about the Russian side of the intelligence campaign at the front than about the Japanese side. As much as this tells about the book, it tells of the state of research on the Russo-Japanese War, and hopefully it will prompt further studies on this topic.

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Coleman, Heather J. *Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905–1929*. Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. xiv + 304 pp. \$45.00. ISBN 0-253-34572-3.

In August 2007, a pastor of a church of the Russian Union of Evangelical Christian-Baptists, Vladimir Ivanovich Kalinin, wrote an open letter to President Vladimir Putin entitled, "Is There a Place for Baptists in Russia?" Heather Coleman's *Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution* sheds historical light on this question and illumines the social, political, and religious complexities associated with "place" and "belonging" when speaking about Russian Baptists.

Coleman's lucid and engaging study follows the fate of Russian Baptists (as opposed to Baptists from other ethnic groups) between 1905, when it became legal to leave the Orthodox Church, and 1929, when Soviet officials withdrew the right from religious organizations to openly preach their ideas and to gather for any purpose other than corporate worship. The book is divided into three sections. The first describes the rise and organization of the Baptist movement in Russia and the legislative framework within which Baptists, both Russian and non-Russian, had to maneuver. It focuses in particular on the growth in the numbers and activities of Baptists following 1905 and examines the appeal that Baptists held for Russian peasants, workers, and artisans. Ironically, those Russians who became Baptists were sometimes uncomfortable with the term "Baptist," considering it non-biblical and non-Russian. Consequently, when forming their communities, they adopted a wide variety of names. In 1903, Baptist leaders embraced the umbrella term "Union of Russian Evangelical Christians–Baptist" in an effort to standardize the identity of the various local communities. While Coleman addresses the differences between the terms "Evangelical" and "Baptist" in the Russian context, it is a distinction that is sometimes difficult to follow. The final chapter in this section moves from the institutional and communal aspects of Russian Baptist life to personal paths of conversion, which, surprisingly, often led believers first through a deep engagement with their native Orthodox faith.

The second section considers responses from the state, the Orthodox Church, and ordinary fellow villagers to the growing number of Russian Baptists. It also describes efforts by Russian Baptists to make a "foreign faith" their own and to articulate their identity as Russians in the face of distrust, hostility, and social alienation. Despite their best efforts to affirm their national allegiances, Baptists came under renewed scrutiny after 1914, when Russia found itself at war with Germany.

The third and final section examines the expansion and eventual repression of Russian Baptist communities following the 1917 revolutions. Coleman pays particular attention to the interface between political and religious language in the revolutionary context. She also shows how Russian